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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant accepts the Statement of Facts of West Valley 
City, particularly as it supplements the Statement of Facts 
set forth in Appellant* s Brief on Appeal. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
JUDGE ATHERTON* S RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT1 S CASE 
REASSIGNMENT ESTABLISHES MANIFEST NECESSITY FOR THE 
PREVIOUSLY DECLARED MISTRIAL IS ERRONEOUS. 
Certain matters which the Defendant initially determined 
should be briefed, no longer appear to be in issue. West 
Valley City has assisted in focusing the issues by agreeing 
with Patten that jeopardy had attached in this bench trial, 
and candidly conceding that Patten did not waive his right to 
object to termination of the trial. 
Both parties are in agreement that the U.S. v Perez, 22 
U.S.(9 Wheat) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824) "manifest 
necessity" formulation, reconfirmed many times by the United 
States Supreme Court, Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 
800, 98 S. C. 824 (1978), and by this Court, State v. Wilson, 
854 P.2d 1029 (Ut. App. 1993), is the appropriate standard to 
apply in determining whether retrial is barred on principles 
of double jeopardy. 
A further point of agreement is that the use of specific 
language such as the words "legal necessity" or "manifest 
necessity" is not required. Patten agrees that it is not 
necessary for a trial court to utter particular magic words. 
Patten does not however agree with the City's primary 
argument that "Judge Nehringfs recusal and reassignment of the 
case is ' manifest necessity* for a mistrial and falls within 
the exceptions contained in § 76-1-403, Utah Code annotated." 
Appellee's Brief, p. 10. 
The immediate difficulty with this argument is that Judge 
Nehring made no such finding of fact, conclusion of law, or 
ruling. The record reflects the special pains he took to make 
clear that the mistrial was based upon the appearance of a an 
entirely unrelated conflict: 
JUDGE: Well, then I'm just going to go into a 
little more detail about. . . . 
2 
STONEY: And then Ifm going to respect what 
the court says. I just wanted the objection on the 
record, 
JUDGE: •••.;d it's noted, and my concern, just 
so it's on the record is this, that the prospect of 
possible conversations with attempts to manipulate 
prosecution of a criminal case in order to advance 
a client's interest in a civil case is so 
distasteful a piece of conduct, but it's still 
something that this relationship suggests might be 
available, and it's because of that possibility, 
that appearance, that I've made this ruling. And 
I'll close again by saying there's no direct 
evidence that that has happened. Thanks for your 
patience. We'll be in recess. 
Tr. Judge1 s Ruling, p. 5; emphasis added. 
Judge Nehring* s written order wli i :11 is the version 
drafted by the City, is likewise clear and unambiguous. It 
first sets forth the "FACT; .>> i e ..- i : 
mistrial: 
Plaintiff called witness and adduced evidence 
during the course of the trial. During the course 
of trial, testimony disclosed that the alleged 
victim had retained private counsel to act on her 
behalf in various divorce proceedings. The 
victim's private counsel is the wife of a West 
Valley Assistant Prosecutor. taking of 
evidence ceased at -^nt point. 
It then states, 
( ' • • • • - • N 
While there is no direct evidence of impropriety 
and the Court is extremely confident that there 
was, in fact, none. The Court finds that the mere 
possibility of conversations between the Assistant 
Prosecutor and his wife, the victim's private 
attorney, suggests an appearance of impropriety 
such that the Court, sua spontef on its own motion 
and against the prosecutions objection, declares a 
mistrial. (R. 67, 68,) 
3 
Then follows the specific Order stating that, M[t]he 
Court declares a mistrial .•. . " (R. 68) 
In ruling on Patten's Motion to Dismiss (R. 169), Judge 
Atherton failed to address any of these factual findings or 
the legal conclusion flowing therefrom. Instead she chose to 
rest her decision on a basis Judge Nehring did not assign and 
which the record does not support. Her ruling that there was 
a "clear and compelling" basis in the record for declaring a 
mistrial on other grounds than those stated is erroneous. 
Judge Nehring did not declare a mistrial on either the 
factual or legal basis that he was required to recuse himself. 
He took the step of reassigning (he did not use the word 
" recuse" ) the case only after declaring a mistrial and stating 
the reasons therefor. Tr. Judge's Ruling, pps. 2-3. Even 
then he did so for reasons he apparently saw no reason to 
particularize and which do not appear on the face of the 
record. His statement to the effect that he had participated 
in "discussions of possible resolutions of the case" and knew 
quite a bit "beyond what I've heard from witnesses and beyond 
what' s on the record" appears to be announced somewhat off-
handedly. He reports no particular untoward effect such 
discussions may have had upon him one way or another, other 
than to say his continued involvement would be 
"inappropriate," nor does he elicit any comments from counsel 
as to their reaction to the reassignment or their possible 
willingness to allow his continued participation. The focus 
4 '. ' 
of attention by both counsel and the trial court was the 
"impropriety," observed during the course of trial, which in 
Judge Nehring' s view compelled the mistrial, not the fact that 
he was reassigning the case to another judge, Tr. Judge' s 
Ruling, pps. 2-5. None of this was inappropriate, improper, 
or even unusual. Having declared a mistrial, trial was over. 
Nothing was at stake; he was free to reassign the case for 
whatever reasons he so desired. 
Judge Atherton' s ruling second guesses Judge Nehring* s 
post trial decision in its statement that "(T)he basis of the 
judgefs reassignment of the case is...fprejudicial conduct in 
or out of the courtroom not attributable to the state, 
mak(ing) it impossible to proceed with the trial without 
injustice to the defendant or the state." (R. 173) Judge 
Nehring made no such finding and her conclusion is not 
supported by the record. It cannot simply be taken for 
granted that because he saw fit to reassign the case after 
terminating the trial for reasons he expressed with clarity, 
that unspecified prejudicial conduct had occurred of the kind 
which any reasonable trial judge would act upon by recusing 
himself had such conduct occurred during the course of the 
trial, any more than it can be assumed that such alleged 
misconduct should not be attributable to the state. 
Certainly, although it is a moot point (trial was over), there 
is no evidence from which to conclude, arguendo, that it would 
have "be(en) impossible to proceed with the trial without 
5 
injustice to the defendant or the state." Id; emphasis 
added. Had there not been a mistrial already declared on 
specific grounds, it is sheer speculation to attempt to 
determine what Judge Nehring might have done upon the basis of 
other grounds which are not elaborated or even discussed with 
counsel. It suffices to say that the record in this case does 
not constrain the conclusion that his recusal and consequent 
mistrial would have been compelled by the Code of Judicial 
Conduct had trial otherwise continued. 
Judge Nehring stated the basis for ordering a mistrial as 
is appropriate. In order for this Court to competently review 
a mistrial order, the termination statute, § 76-l-403(c), 
U.C.A., requires that the trial court make specific findings 
and state a basis in the record for declaring a mistrial. 
State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 360 (Utah, 1979)("[W]e have no 
basis from which to conclude whether the court engaged in the 
scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion required when 
dealing with the important rights here involved."); State v. 
Castle, 951 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Ut. App. 1998)(M[I]n entering its 
order of mistrial, the court should have more closely tracked 
the statutory language.11) In fact the judge was quite precise 
in enunciating his basis for declaring a mistrial. It was 
not, however, as the City urges, any perceived need to recuse 
himself. And it does not follow that recusal following a 
mistrial necessarily suggests that the former flowed from the 
6 
latter• This is sheer post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning, 
unsupported by any more substantial connection or logic. 
The case law cited by the City fails to address this 
issue. The decisions the City relies upon are primarily those 
in which the trial judge discovers a conflict mid-trial 
because of his own personal relationship to one or more of the 
witnesses, or because of an overwhelming bias or impartiality 
developed during the course of trial as a result of the 
conduct of one of the litigants, or similar circumstances, 
which were then stated with due particularity on the record in 
support of a sua sponte declaration of mistrial. 
For example, in State v. Graham, 960 P. 2d 457 (Wash. App. 
Div. 2 1998), the trial judge recused himself mid-trial 
because he discovered that one of the police officers 
testifying before him was an employee of a city for which he 
was the city attorney. Having found himself in a blatant 
position of conflict, he inquired whether the parties would 
consent to his further participation. When the defendant 
refused, he declared a mistrial. That is not this case. 
Here Judge Nehring observed the appearance of impropriety, 
"the prospect of possible conversations with attempts to 
manipulate prosecution of a criminal case in order to advance 
a client's interest in a civil case...something that this 
relationship suggests might be available, and its because of 
that possibility, that appearance, I've made this (mistrial) 
ruling...." Judge's Ruling, p. 5. This conclusion is, so far 
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as can be determined from the record, totally unrelated to his 
decision to reassign the case. 
Graham, and other cases upon which the City relies, 
stands for the proposition that "where a trial judge properly 
exercises his discretion to recuse . • . ' manifest necessity' 
is established for the resulting mistrial" Id. 460. Graham 
speaks of the "resulting" mistrial. But no mistrial resulted 
from Judge Nehring* s recusal. A mistrial was declared. Only 
thereafter did recusal occur. 
It is noted in Graham that a showing either of bad faith 
or negligence is antithetical to the manifest necessity 
requirement: "...[n]egligent behaviors can negate "manifest 
necessity" where there is an alternative to cure the 
situation." Id. 461. This is not of course to suggest that 
there was either bad faith or negligence in Judge Nehring1 s 
reassigning the case. There were undoubtedly no attempts to 
"cure the situation" because at the time of the recusal there 
was literally nothing to cure; trial was over. 
The City cites State v. Bailey, 465 S.E.2d 284 (Ga. App. 
1995) for the proposition that "...where the decision to 
declare a mistrial is bias on the part of the fact finder, the 
trial court's decision to declare a mistrial is entitled to 
the highest deference." Id. at 286. See also Commonwealth v. 
Liester, 712 A. 2d 332 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) cited by the City. 
No doubt this is correct law, but inapposite to this appeal. 
Judge Nehring simply made no such ruling. 
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The City however stresses that the authorities require 
great deference be paid to the decision to declare a mistrial. 
If this is intended to apply to Judge Atherton?s decision, it 
is completely misplaced. Judge Atherton was not present at 
trial and could have had no notion what information Judge 
Nehring may have acquired off the record. The rationale for 
granting deference to a trial court1 s mistrial decisions is 
that the trial judge, being physically present during the 
course of proceedings, has first hand and therefor greater 
knowledge and familiarity with the facts, circumstances, and 
dynamics of the trial and attendant circumstances. Arizona v 
Washington, 98 S.C. 824, 832, 434 U.S. 497, 510, 54 L.Ed. 2d 
717 (1978). Consequently, there is no basis whatsoever to 
afford Judge Atherton' s decision any deference. See also 
Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1194, 1296 (Ut. 
App. 1996). 
The City argues that Judge Nehring' s mistrial ruling 
should be given great deference, even though he did not rule 
that he was ordering a mistrial for the reason that he was 
required to recuse himself. This is illogical. Judge Nehring 
ordered a mistrial because he saw a conflict entirely 
extrinsic to his own participation. This decision, which the 
City concedes is in error, would be entitled to deference for 
all the reasons previously stated. Having made the decision, 
he then found it appropriate to transfer the case, a decision 
which is entitled to no deference whatsoever in relation to 
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the preceding mistrial because it has no necessary logically 
connected. 
The City argues that an unsigned docket entry establishes 
that the mistrial was actually founded upon Judge Nehring' s 
recusal. Appellee's Brief, p. 11. This is likewise 
incorrect. An unsigned docket entry cannot alter what the 
judge actually ordered and is legally insufficient as a basis 
upon which to assess the merits of his decision. Shioji v. 
Shioii, 671 P.2d 135,(Utah 1983); Ron Shepherd Insurance, 
Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994). 
POINT II 
JUDGE NEHRING' S CONJECTURED MISTRIAL RULING ON 
GROUNDS OF RECUSAL MUST BE GIVEN CLOSE APPELLATE 
SCRUTINY. 
The City nonetheless asserts that Judge Nehringf s 
mistrial order should be given great deference if some other 
support in the record can be found for it. In addressing 
exactly this point, the U. S. Supreme Court in Arizona v. 
Washington, supra, reasoned as follows: 
If the record reveals that the trial judge has 
failed to exercise the "sound discretion" entrusted 
to him, the reason for such deference disappears. 
Thus, if the trial judge acts for reasons 
completely unrelated to the trial problem which 
purports to be the basis for the mistrial ruling, 
close appellate scrutiny is appropriate. Cf. U.S. 
v. Gordy, 526 F.2d 631 (CA5 1976). 
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 98 S. Ct. 824, 54 L. 
Ed. 2d 717, (1978) foot note 28; emphasis added. 
Judge Atherton ruled that Judge Nehring correctly ordered 
a mistrial but for the wrong reason, i.e., "for reasons 
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completely unrelated to the trial problem which purports to be 
the basis for the mistrial ruling," Id, The City adopts this 
view and urges that this Court afford great deference to Judge 
Nehring' s decision. But analyzed against the backdrop of the 
logic of Arizona v. Washington, id., the contrary position is 
the proper one. Thus this Court should give the mistrial 
ruling, not great deference, but, instead, close scrutiny. 
Beginning with the basics, it is well settled that the 
"manifest necessity" doctrine is designed to accommodate the 
defendant's valued constitutional right to have his trial 
begun and completed by a particular tribunal. Wade v. Hunter, 
336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.C. 834, 837, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1949); 
State v. Ambrose, supra, 598 P.2d 354, 358, (Utah 1970). It 
was formulated to appropriately characterize the heavy burden 
placed upon the prosecution to demonstrate that former 
jeopardy does not preclude re-trial. Arizona v. Washington, 
supra, 434 U.S. at 506, 98 S.C. at 831. 
Considering the meaning of the words "manifest 
necessity," given its common sense interpretation, "manifest" 
means "patently obvious." It has been formally defined as, 
"To show plainly; to make to appear distinctively; to put 
beyond question or doubt; to display; to exhibit; reveal; 
prove; evince; evidence." Webster's International 
Dictionary, Second Edition, Unabridged, 1938. Elsewhere it 
is defined as, "Clearly apparent to the sight; obvious." The 
American Heritage® Concise Dictionary, Third Edition, Houghton 
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Mifflin, 1994. The word "necessity" is said to have a 
variable meaning depending on its usage. In this context it 
means a "high degree" of necessity. Arizona v. Washington, 
supra, 434 U.S. at 506, 98 S.C. at 831. 
Applying these definitions to the case at bar, it cannot 
be said that it is manifest, i.e., plainly shown, beyond 
question or doubt, or obvious that had Judge Nehring not 
declared a mistrial on the basis announced, he would have 
found a "high degree" of necessity to recuse himself and 
declare a mistrial on the basis of having heard matters off 
the record. It is not plainly shown in the record that he had 
any reason other than the one he recited for granting the 
mistrial and it is not sensible to bootstrap his post-trial 
decision to reassign the case into a basis for the mistrial 
itself. 
POINT III 
A MISTRIAL RESULTING FROM RECUSAL REQUIRES 
FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS FROM 
REASSIGNMENT AFTER DECLARING A MISTRIAL, THE 
FORMER IS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION, WHILE THE 
LATTER IS INCONSEQUENTIAL. 
The critical distinction between recusal during trial and 
reassignment after trial is that prior to declaring a 
mistrial, a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to 
have his trial begun and finished before the same tribunal. 
Wade v. Hunter, supra, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.C. 834, 837, 35 
L.Ed.2d 425 (1949); State v. Ambrose, supra, 598 P.2d 354, 
358, (Utah 1970). But once mistrial has been declared, no 
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such constitutional right or privilege obtains. On the 
contrary, as is the case with all litigants, civil or 
criminal, an accused has no right to demand a particular judge 
before whom to be tried. 
Once jeopardy attaches in a bench trial, the defendant 
has a constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment to have 
his trial completed by the same judge, "the valued right to 
have his trial completed by a particular tribunal." Wade v. 
Hunter, supra; State v. Ambrose, supra. After declaring a 
mistrial, the defendant has no right whatsoever to be tried 
again by the same judge. 
Different standards apply and the differential in the 
gravidas of the two situations is enormous. Because an 
accused enjoys a constitutional right to have his or her trial 
completed by the same court, no judge would take lightly his 
or her obligation as fact finder to complete a criminal trial 
once begun. After the trial is terminated, however, any risk 
of transgressing an accused' s constitutional rights disappears 
completely; there is no error whatsoever even if the judge has 
no basis for transferring the case. Any claimed error would 
be harmless in the extreme. The defendant simply cannot be 
prejudiced. It is the fundamental difference between the 
constitutional right to be free from being twice put in 
jeopardy, and no right at all. The former is of paramount 
concern, while the latter is entitled to no consideration 
whatsoever. 
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It must be assumed that Judge Nehring and counsel were at 
least on some level aware of this distinction. Close scrutiny 
of the record bears this out. Little concern or attention was 
paid to the reassignment. The same cannot be said regarding 
the basis of the mistrial ruling. 
Consequently, it is evident that Judge Nehring* s recusal 
cannot, on the state of this record, provide a basis for 
sustaining Judge Atherton* s ruling that there was a compelling 
basis for his ordering a mistrial. A "manifest necessity" is 
not and cannot be shown. 
CONCLUSION 
The Memorandum Decision of Judge Atherton denying Mr. 
Patten* s Motion to Dismiss on double jeopardy grounds should 
be reversed with directions to the trial court to dismiss the 
combined cases. ^ 
DATED this p^*J day of January, 1999. 
^ ^ 
I ^ Attorney for 
- ^ Defendant/Petitioner 
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